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     OAKES, Senior Circuit Judge: 
     Judith S. Dici ("Dici") appeals from a summary judgment 
entered on September 27, 1995, by the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in favor of 
Appellees Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State 
Police, Bureau of Liquor Enforcement, Frank H. Monaco ("Monaco"), 
and Steven Brison ("Brison").  Dici sought monetary and 
injunctive relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C.  2000e et seq. (1994), and the Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.  951 et seq. (1991 
& Supp. 1994) ("PHRA"), for several alleged incidents of sexual 
harassment and racial bias.  On appeal, Dici contends that the 
district court erred in finding her claims precluded by a 
previous state workmen's compensation determination arising out 
of many of the same incidents alleged by Dici in this case.  Dici 
further claims that genuine issues of material fact prevent entry 
of summary judgment in favor of the Appellees.  For the reasons 
stated below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. 
 
                            BACKGROUND 
     Dici began working as a liquor enforcement officer for the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania on October 19, 1975.  In 1978, Dici 
became an employee of the Pennsylvania State Police when it 
assumed the responsibilities of the Bureau of Liquor Enforcement.  
Dici's duties included conducting undercover investigations of 
premises licensed by the Commonwealth for violations of the 
liquor law and patrolling for underage drinkers.  In 1989 and 
1990, Dici taught driver training to Liquor Control Enforcement 
cadets at the State Police Academy.  Appellee Brison was also a 
liquor enforcement officer during the time period at issue.  
Appellee Monaco supervised Dici during her employment with the 
State Police. 
     Dici claims that on August 26, 1990, she became physically 
ill and totally disabled as a result of the Appellees' conduct.  
On June 14, 1991, Dici sought state workmen's compensation for 
the mental and physical disorders she alleged to have suffered as 
a result of sexual and racial harassment on the job.  In both the 
case presently before us and the state workmen's compensation 
proceeding, Dici alleged the following incidents of harassment 
and bias: 
     (1)  In November 1988, at a graduation party for 
     transitional training, fellow employee Jerome Farmer, 
     who dated Dici in the past, said to Dici "Why don't you 
     and I get together and I'll show you just how much I 
     like you."  Dici walked away and reported the incident 
     the next day.  Farmer denied the incident occurred. 
 
     (2)  In August 1989, Farmer said to Dici, "Jude, we'll 
     get together and I'm sure we can work something out."  
     Dici declined, and later reported the incident to 
     Monaco.  Monaco informed her that she could not 
     directly contact the Affirmative Action Officer (whose 
     duties included handling reports of sexual harassment).  
     Monaco claimed that when he later learned that officers 
     could contact the Affirmative Action Officer directly, 
     he went to Dici and told her of the mistake.  Dici 
     claimed Monaco never approached her with the 
     information.  Farmer denied the incident occurred. 
 
     (3)  Dici inquired of Monaco about teaching a public 
     speaking class in Harrisburg.  Monaco, who knew that 
     Dici had also applied for an auditing position in 
     Harrisburg, said, "Harrisburg, where you want to be."  
     Dici interpreted this statement to be a comment on her 
     dating relationship with Captain Clanaghan, a black 
     officer stationed in Harrisburg.  Monaco denied the 
     statement was made. 
 
     (4)  On April 15, 1989 (a weekend day), two officers 
     took Dici into the men's bathroom at the district 
     office and showed her a drawing of a nude woman 
     kneeling down and leaning forward with her mouth open.  
     Dici's name was scrawled above the drawing.  Dici 
     complained to Monaco the following Monday.  Dici 
     claimed Monaco told her that the drawing was flattering 
     and there was nothing he could do about the drawing 
     because the bathroom was public.  Monaco claimed never 
     to have made such a statement and notes that the 
     drawing was removed on that Monday.  Other witnesses 
     stated that the drawing had been on the wall since 1987 
     and only recently had been modified to include Dici's 
     name. 
 
     (5)  In September or October 1989, Dici was a driving 
     instructor for Brison, an officer trainee at the time.  
     Brison told Dici that he did not like being taught how 
     to drive by a woman. 
 
     (6)  In April 1990, when Brison and Dici were on patrol 
     for underage drinkers, Brison told Dici that "the only 
     [underage drinker] you would catch would be one with a 
     broken leg." 
 
     (7)  In July 1990, Dici approached Brison to attempt to 
     reconcile their differences.  Brison told Dici that 
     women did not belong in law enforcement. 
 
     (8)  On July 20, 1990, while on patrol, Brison said to 
     Dici, "a lot of good you would try to be if they run 
     away."  Dici responded, "I've got a lot of patience but 
     it's wearing thin, maybe your ego needs its ass 
     kicked."  Brison replied, "who higher up in the 
     department do you have in mind to do it for you?"  Dici 
     said, "no one, I'd try it myself." 
 
     (9) On July 29, 1990, Dici was informed by another 
     officer that Brison had made negative racial comments 
     about a black trainee under Dici's supervision. 
 
     (10)  Dici claimed to have heard about, but not seen, a 
     family photograph brought into the office by Brison 
     depicting Ku Klux Klan members in full regalia. 
     The workmen's compensation referee found against Dici.  The 
referee, after hearing many witnesses from both parties over 
several days, determined that Farmer's testimony was credible, 
and that the first and second incident listed above did not 
occur.  The referee also found the following:  (1) that Monaco's 
testimony was credible and that the comments attributed to him by 
Dici did not occur as related by Dici; (2) that the incident of 
the drawing on the bathroom wall had occurred, but that the 
drawing had been promptly removed when Dici brought it to 
Monaco's attention; (3) that Brison's racial remarks and the 
display of the Ku Klux Klan photo of Brison's family were not 
directed toward Dici; and (4) that Brison had made the statements 
alleged by Dici in the fifth, sixth, and eighth incidents listed 
above, but that these statements had occurred sporadically.  The 
referee also noted that Brison had been reprimanded for these 
comments as well as for his negative racial remarks. 
     On the basis of these factual findings, the referee 
determined that Dici had not been harassed or subjected to an 
abnormal working environment, and thus could not recover 
workmen's compensation benefits.  The Workmen's Compensation 
Appeal Board denied Dici's appeal on September 13, 1994, and the 
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court affirmed the Board on August 3, 
1995.  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied Dici's Petition 
for Allowance of Appeal on April 11, 1996. 
     Dici filed a federal complaint on November 5, 1993.  In 
addition to the incidents detailed above, Dici claimed the 
following episodes of bias occurred: 
     (1)  In October 1989, Monaco refused to assign Dici to 
     a temporary supervisory position and instead assigned a 
     male employee with fewer years of experience to the 
     position. 
 
     (2)  In May 1990, Dici's vacation leave was twice 
     cancelled by Monaco for invalid reasons. 
 
     (3)  On numerous occasions, Dici would work several 
     days in a row but then be refused long weekends that 
     were regularly granted to other officers. 
 
     (4)  On many occasions, Monaco refused to allow Dici to 
     attend training classes though he allowed male officers 
     to attend. 
 
     (5)  Monaco and several other male employees placed 
     depictions of scantily clad women on the walls and 
     desks of the office. 
 
     (6)  On several occasions, male officers referred to 
     Dici by various degrading terms and made improper 
     remarks regarding her relationship with Captain 
     Clanaghan and her friendship with other black officers. 
 
     In her first claim for relief, Dici asserted that the 
Appellees' behavior discriminated against Dici based upon sex and 
racial affiliation in violation of Title VII.  In her second 
claim for relief, Dici asserted that this same behavior violated 
the PHRA.  Following discovery, the Appellees moved for summary 
judgment.  The district court referred the case to a United 
States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation in 
accordance with the Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C.  636(b)(1)(A) 
and (B) (1994), and Rules 72.1.3 and 72.1.4 of the Western 
District of Pennsylvania Local Rules for Magistrates.  The 
magistrate judge recommended that summary judgment be granted to 
the Appellees, stating that "both counts of Dici's Complaint are 
based upon the exact allegations of her workmen's compensation 
claim: viz., that she had experienced harassment which was the 
result of discrimination which was based upon her gender and her 
association with an Afro-American State Police Captain."  The 
magistrate judge concluded, "[t]he Commonwealth Court's 
determination that Dici was not subject to harassment caused by 
gender and racial affiliation discrimination precludes 
relitigation of this issue in this court."  After hearing 
objections and responses from the parties, the district court 
adopted the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation and 
granted summary judgment to the Appellees. 
 
                            DISCUSSION 
     Dici claims that issue preclusion should not bar this case 
because the standard for granting a workmen's compensation claim 
on the basis of emotional injury in Pennsylvania is different 
from the standard for recovering damages under Title VII.  Dici 
further claims that genuine issues of material fact prevent entry 
of summary judgment in favor of the Appellees. 
     Summary judgment is mandated when "there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Childers 
v. Joseph, 842 F.2d 689, 693-94 (3d Cir. 1988).  In assessing the 
evidence, all factual inferences must be drawn in favor of Dici, 
the non-moving party.  Arab African Int'l. Bank v. Epstein, 958 
F.2d 532, 534 (3d Cir. 1992).  A court must determine "whether 
the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require 
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party 
must prevail as a matter of law."  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986); see also Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).  On appeal, our review of the 
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
Appellees on the ground of issue preclusion is plenary.  Arab 
African Int'l Bank, 958 F.2d at 534. 
I.  Issue Preclusion:  "[O]nce a court has decided an issue of 
fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude 
relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of 
action involving a party to the first case."  Allen v. McCurry, 
449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980); see also Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments  27 (1982).  This doctrine is known as issue 
preclusion, or, more traditionally, as collateral estoppel.  SeeMigra v. 
Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 n.1 
(1984).  Issue preclusion is based upon the policy that "a losing 
litigant deserves no rematch after a defeat fairly suffered, in 
adversarial proceedings, on an issue identical in substance to 
the one he subsequently seeks to raise."  Astoria Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 107 (1991);  see also 18 
Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure  4416 
(1981) ("later courts should honor the first actual decision of a 
matter that has been actually litigated").  The doctrine of issue 
preclusion reduces the costs of multiple lawsuits, facilitates 
judicial consistency, conserves judicial resources, and 
"encourage[s] reliance on adjudication."  Allen, 449 U.S. at 94. 
     A federal court examining the preclusive effect of a state 
court judgment must look to the Federal Full Faith and Credit 
Act, 28 U.S.C.  1738 (1994): 
     Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings . . . shall 
     have the same full faith and credit in every court 
     within the United States . . . as they have by law or 
     usage in the courts of such State, Territory or 
     Possession from which they are taken. 
Under  1738, a federal court in a Title VII action should grant 
preclusive effect to a state court decision upholding a state 
administrative agency determination when the state court's 
decision would be barred by issue preclusion in subsequent 
actions in that state's own courts.  Kremer v. Chemical Const. 
Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 476-78 (1982).   
     In Kremer, the specific issue before the Court was whether a 
state court decision reviewing a state employment discrimination 
agency determination should be preclusive in a later Title VII 
case.  Though Dici urges that we limit Kremer to cases involving 
state employment discrimination agencies, nothing in Kremersuggests such a 
narrow reading.  Indeed, we have extended Kremerto state court review of 
agency decisions in areas other than 
employment discrimination.  See Edmundson v. Borough of Kennett 
Square, 4 F.3d 186, 189-90 (3d Cir. 1993) (state court review of 
an unemployment compensation board decision); Rider v. 
Pennsylvania, 850 F.2d 982, 994 (3d Cir.) (state court review of 
an arbitrator's collective bargaining agreement determination), 
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 993 (1988); Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 
111, 121 (3d Cir. 1988) (state court review of Township Council's 
wrongful discharge determination).  These extensions are 
supported by Kremer's statement that "[n]othing in the 
legislative history of [Title VII] suggests that Congress 
considered it necessary or desirable to provide an absolute right 
to relitigate in federal court an issue resolved by a state 
court."  456 U.S. at 473.  As the Court noted, "[s]tate 
authorities are charged with enforcing laws, and state courts are 
presumed competent to interpret those laws."  Id. at 478. 
     Thus, by the terms of  1738 and Kremer, the prior state 
workmen's compensation decision, affirmed by the Pennsylvania 
Commonwealth Court, may preclude Dici's Title VII action.  In 
order to determine whether issue preclusion applies, we must look 
to Pennsylvania law to discover the extent to which the workmen's 
compensation decision would be granted preclusive effect in a 
later state court proceeding. 
     In Pennsylvania, issue preclusion "'forecloses re-litigation 
in a later action[] of an issue of fact or law which was actually 
litigated and which was necessary to the original judgment.'"  
Hebden v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Bethenergy Mines, 
Inc.), 534 Pa. 327, 330, 632 A.2d 1302, 1304 (1993) (quoting City 
of Pittsburgh v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 522 Pa. 44, 55, 559 
A.2d 896, 901 (1989)); see also Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments,  27 cmt. c (1982) ("An issue on which relitigation is 
foreclosed may be one of evidentiary fact, of 'ultimate fact' 
(i.e., the application of law to fact), or of law.").  Issue 
preclusion is appropriately invoked if: 
     (1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication was 
     identical with the one presented in the later action, 
     (2) there was a final judgment on the merits, (3) the 
     party against whom the plea is asserted was a party or 
     in privity with a party to the prior adjudication, and 
     (4) the party against whom it is asserted has had a 
     full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in 
     question in a prior action. 
Safeguard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 463 Pa. 567, 574, 345 A.2d 
664, 668 (1975) (citations omitted); Shaffer v. Smith, 673 A.2d 
872, 874 (Pa. 1996).  The party asserting issue preclusion, here 
the Appellees, bears the burden of proving its applicability to 
the case at hand.  See United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. 
Supp. 1193, 1200 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (citing Allen v. Zurich Ins. 
Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1165-66 (4th Cir. 1982) and Hernandez v. City 
of Los Angeles, 624 F.2d 935, 937-38 (9th Cir. 1980)). 
     There can be no dispute that the second and third criteria 
for issue preclusion listed above have been fulfilled.  The 
judgment of the Commonwealth Court, affirming denial of workmen's 
compensation to Dici, became final in August 1995, and the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Dici's Petition for Allowance 
of Appeal in April 1996.  Also, Dici was clearly a party to the 
workmen's compensation proceeding.  Thus, the applicability of 
issue preclusion in this case depends upon the first and fourth 
criteria:  whether the issues presented in the workmen's 
compensation proceeding are identical to those now before us, and 
whether Dici enjoyed a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 
issues in the prior proceeding.  If either criterion is not met, 
we will not apply issue preclusion in this case.   
     The district court, adopting the Magistrate's Report and 
Recommendation, found that "both counts of Dici's complaint are 
based upon the exact allegations of her workmen's compensation 
claim . . . . [t]he Commonwealth Court's determination that Dici 
was not subject to harassment caused by gender and racial 
affiliation discrimination precludes relitigation of this issue 
in this court."  We disagree with the conclusion of the district 
court and find that the legal issues presented in the 
Pennsylvania workmen's compensation hearing were not identical to 
the issues of Dici's Title VII case. 
     Pennsylvania has adopted an objective test for determining 
whether a psychic injury may qualify an employee for workmen's 
compensation.  Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Workmen's 
Compensation Appeal Bd. (Guaracino), 675 A.2d 1213, 1215 (Pa. 
1996).  When, as in Dici's case, no physical injury triggers the 
psychic injury,  
     the claimant must prove either (a) that actual 
     extraordinary events occurred at work which caused the 
     trauma and that these specific events can be pinpointed 
     in time or (b) that abnormal working conditions over a 
     longer period of time caused the psychic injury. 
North Huntingdon Township v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. 
(Noble), 165 Pa. Commw. 33, 37, 644 A.2d 227, 229, appeal denied, 
539 Pa. 659, 651 A.2d 545 (1994).  It appears from the workmen's 
compensation record that Dici proceeded under the second of these 
prongs, the "abnormal working conditions" theory.  The phrase 
"abnormal working conditions" is used by the Pennsylvania courts 
     to distinguish psychiatric injuries that are 
     compensable because the necessary causal relationship 
     between the employment and mental disability has been 
     established from those psychiatric injuries that arise 
     from the employee's subjective reactions to normal 
     working conditions. 
Martin v. Ketchum, Inc., 523 Pa. 509, 518, 568 A.2d 159, 164 
(1990). 
     In order to meet the objective test for abnormal working 
conditions, a worker must show that the employment circumstances 
would, by their nature, cause mental injury to one with a 
"healthy psyche."  Calabris v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. 
(American General Cos.), 141 Pa. Commw. 405, 413, 595 A.2d 765, 
769 (1991); see also Marsico v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. 
(Dept. of Revenue), 138 Pa. Commw. 352, 359, 588 A.2d 984, 987-88 
(1991) (no compensation for a psychic injury arising from 
harassment unless the alleged harassment qualifies as "abnormal 
working conditions").  Under the Pennsylvania workmen's 
compensation scheme, then, Dici was required to show that the 
harassment she suffered was conduct that would cause mental 
injury in an average worker with a "healthy psyche." 
     By contrast, in order to recover under Title VII, a worker 
need not demonstrate that the conduct alleged caused a tangible 
psychological injury.  Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., __ U.S. 
__, 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993).  In Harris, the Court reversed a 
lower court's decision that Harris could not recover Title VII 
damages.  The lower court had found that the conduct Harris 
alleged "was not so severe as to be expected to seriously affect 
plaintiff's psychological well-being."  Id. at 371.  Reversing, 
the Court held that  
     [c]ertainly Title VII bars conduct that would seriously 
     affect a reasonable person's psychological well-being, 
     but the statute is not limited to such conduct.  So 
     long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, 
     and is perceived, as hostile or abusive, there is no 
     need for it also to be psychologically injurious. 
Id. (emphasis added) (citing Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 
U.S. 57, 67 (1986)). 
     Thus, the legal issues in Dici's workmen's compensation 
proceeding are not identical to those in the Title VII context.  
In the Pennsylvania workmen's compensation framework, 
"harassment" and "abnormal working conditions" are defined in 
terms of objective mental injury; in the Title VII context, 
psychological injury is not required.  We therefore find that 
issue preclusion cannot apply to the legal questions presented in 
Dici's case. 
     Though the legal issues are distinct, many of the factual 
allegations in the workmen's compensation proceeding and this 
case are identical.  The workmen's compensation referee credited 
as true only a few of the incidents alleged by Dici, and found as 
a matter of fact that the remainder had not occurred, or had not 
occurred as Dici alleged.  Mindful that preclusion may apply to 
both legal and factual issues, Hebden, 534 Pa. at 330, 632 A.2d 
at 1304; Restatement (Second) of Judgments  27 cmt. c (1982), we 
must consider whether Dici may relitigate in federal court those 
factual issues already determined not credible by the workmen's 
compensation referee.  Reviewing Pennsylvania law, we believe 
that a Pennsylvania court would not apply issue preclusion to the 
facts of Dici's case. 
     In Odgers v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Board of 
Review, 514 Pa. 378, 525 A.2d 359 (1987), the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court refused to grant preclusive effect to an earlier 
Commonwealth Court ruling.  In the first action, the Commonwealth 
Court found that the school district employees' work stoppage was 
a strike within the meaning of the Pennsylvania Public Employee 
Relations Act ("PERA").  When individual employees later applied 
for unemployment compensation, the Unemployment Compensation 
Board of Review determined that the Commonwealth Court's 
characterization of the work stoppage as a strike precluded the 
employees from relitigating the nature of the work stoppage under 
Pennsylvania's unemployment compensation laws. 
     The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Board's finding, 
however, holding that the PERA issue before the Commonwealth 
Court was not identical to the issue presented in the 
unemployment compensation proceeding.  As the court stated, PERA 
and the unemployment compensation laws "embody different policies 
and involve different rights."  Id. at 389, 364.  Subsequent to 
Odgers, several other Pennsylvania cases have denied preclusive 
effect to both the facts and law of an earlier judgment when the 
policies and procedures applicable to the first action were 
different from those of the later action.  See Verbilla v. 
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Schuylkill Nursing Ass'n), 668 
A.2d 601 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995) (unemployment compensation 
referee's factual findings that hospital worker was not abused by 
patient did not preclude later workmen's compensation proceeding 
regarding whether worker was injured in the course of employment 
because the policies and procedures of the two legal schemes were 
not similar); Johnsonbaugh v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 665 
A.2d 20 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995) (unemployment compensation hearing 
determination that worker did not engage in willful misconduct 
did not preclude later Civil Service Commission decision 
regarding whether the employer dismissed the worker for just 
cause because the two issues were distinct as were the policies 
of the two legal schemes); Bortz v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal 
Bd. (Renzor Div. of FL Indus.), 656 A.2d 554 (Pa. Commw. Ct.) 
(unemployment compensation finding regarding willful misconduct 
not preclusive in later workmen's compensation hearing regarding 
unsatisfactory job performance because the issues and the 
procedures in the two proceedings were distinct), appeal granted, 
542 Pa. 675, 668 A.2d 1137 (1995). 
     The Appellees contend that Odgers and its progeny apply only 
to issue preclusion decisions in cases involving two agency 
determinations, rather than to cases involving an earlier agency 
determination and a later civil suit.  We do not find merit in 
this argument.  Nothing in Odgers purports to limit its effect to 
cases involving preclusion between agencies.  Indeed, the 
rationale behind Odgers is as applicable to agency/civil suit 
preclusion as it is to agency/agency preclusion.  We have 
recognized this by applying the principles of Odgers to cases 
where preclusion was asserted between an earlier state agency 
determination and a later federal civil action.  See Swineford v. 
Snyder County Pennsylvania, 15 F.3d 1258 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(unemployment compensation hearing findings not preclusive in a 
later  1983 action); Kelley v. TYK Refractories Co., 860 F.2d 
1188 (3d Cir. 1988) (factual findings of unemployment 
compensation hearing not preclusive in later  1981 suit);  
Tukesbrey v. Midwest Transit, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 1192 (W.D. Pa. 
1993) (unemployment compensation hearing determination regarding 
wrongful misconduct not preclusive in a later Veteran's 
Reemployment Rights Act case regarding just termination). 
     As we stated in Swineford, "[u]nder Odgers, reviewing courts 
must look beyond the superficial similarities between the two 
issues to the policies behind the two actions.  Only where the 
two actions promote similar policies will the two issues be 
identical for purposes of issue preclusion."  Swineford, 15 F.3d 
at 1267-68.  We believe that Pennsylvania courts would apply this 
reasoning to the workmen's compensation proceeding in Dici's 
case.  The policy of Title VII is to achieve equality of 
employment opportunities and remedy discrimination in the 
workplace.  By contrast, Pennsylvania's workmen's compensation 
law is designed to define the liability of employers for injuries 
to employees occurring in the course of employment.  Moreover, 
the procedures utilized in workmen's compensation proceedings 
differ from those employed in federal court.  For example, 
"[n]either the board nor any of its members nor any referee shall 
be bound by the common law or statutory rules of evidence in 
conducting any hearing or investigation . . . ."  77 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann.  834 (1991).  Given this court's admonition that 
"[r]easonable doubt as to what was decided by a prior judgment 
should be resolved against using it as an estoppel," Gregory, 843 
F.2d at 121 (quoting Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270, 1274 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 346 (1970)), we find that issue 
preclusion should not apply to the facts of Dici's case. 
     In holding that the law and facts of Dici's case are not 
precluded, we do not mean to imply that a Pennsylvania workmen's 
compensation determination should never be given preclusive 
effect in a later suit.  Indeed, in many cases preclusion has 
been found appropriate.  For example, in Capobianchi v. Bic 
Corp., 666 A.2d 344 (Pa. Super. Ct.), appeal denied, 674 A.2d 
1065 (1995), the court determined that a workmen's compensation 
hearing determination regarding the cause of the worker's injury 
should be given preclusive effect in a later products liability 
action.  The court found that the issues presented in both 
proceedings, viz., whether the worker's neck injury was caused by 
a degenerative condition or by an exploding Bic lighter, were 
identical.  Id. at 349.  See also Phillips v. A.P. Green 
Refractories Co., 630 A.2d 874 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (workmen's 
compensation decision that worker did not suffer silicosis 
preclusive in later products liability suit), aff'd, 542 Pa. 124, 
665 A.2d 1167 (1994); Grant v. GAF Corp., 608 A.2d 1047 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1992) (workmen's compensation finding that worker's 
cancer was not caused by asbestos in the workplace preclusive in 
later products liability case), aff'd, 536 Pa. 429, 639 A.2d 1170 
(1994).  As the Grant court found, "proximate cause in a personal 
injury tort action and causal connection in workmen's 
compensation cases are analogous principles."  Id. at 1057.  
These cases demonstrate that when the issues presented are the 
same, Pennsylvania courts will not hesitate to grant preclusive 
effect to workmen's compensation proceedings. 
     As is evident from a review of Dici's case, however, the 
issues presented in this Title VII case are different from those 
of the workmen's compensation proceeding.  The differences are 
highlighted when one examines the distinct policies underlying 
each legal regime.  Therefore, it would be inappropriate to apply 
issue preclusion to this case.  We reverse the district court's 
grant of summary judgment to the Appellees on this basis. 
II.  Other Grounds for Summary Judgment:  The Appellees moved for 
summary judgment both on the ground of issue preclusion and on 
the merits.  Brison moved for summary judgment for the additional 
reason that an individual co-employee cannot be held liable under 
Title VII.  On appeal, Dici claims that if issue preclusion does 
not bar her case, genuine issues of material fact exist 
precluding summary judgment.  The district court, having found 
that issue preclusion applied, did not address the other grounds 
for summary judgment offered by the Appellees.  Though our review 
of a summary judgment motion is plenary, we think that the 
district court is in the better position to consider whether 
summary judgment is proper on the merits of this case given that 
issue preclusion was the focus of the briefs and arguments before 
us.  Therefore, we believe the best course is to remand the case 
to the district court. 
     We can, however, on the record and briefs before us, decide 
whether Steven Brison and Frank Monaco are proper defendants to 
Dici's Title VII and PHRA claims.  When the issue of individual 
liability was before this court in Sheridan v. E. I. DuPont de 
Nemours, 1996 W.L. 36283 (3d Cir. 1996), vacated, 74 F.3d 1439 
(3d Cir. 1996), the court held that an individual employee cannot 
be liable under Title VII.  The majority opinion written by Judge 
Alito noted the great weight of authority from other courts of 
appeals holding an employee cannot be sued under Title VII.  See, 
e.g., Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313 (2d Cir. 1995); 
Cross v. Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490, 1504 (11th Cir. 1995); Grant v. 
Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 1994); Sauers v. Salt 
Lake Co., 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993); Miller v. Maxwell 
Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993).  Chief Judge 
Sloviter, who dissented in Sheridan on other grounds, commented 
that, although she found the reasoning of those judges who 
dissented from the opinions in the other circuits convincing, in 
light of the authority otherwise she saw no reason to dissent 
from the Sheridan majority on the issue of individual liability 
under Title VII.   
     The Sheridan opinion was withdrawn when the court voted to 
take the case en banc, and the appeal was argued before the en 
banc court on May 14, 1996.  However, the principal focus of the 
en banc briefs and arguments was on Title VII issues other than 
individual liability.  In light of this, we conclude, for the 
reasons previously given by the court in Sheridan and the other 
courts of appeals, that individual employees cannot be held 
liable under Title VII.  Therefore, Dici cannot sustain her Title 
VII claims against Brison and Monaco.  To this extent, then, we 
affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment, though on 
different grounds. 
     Dici argues that even if an individual employee cannot be 
liable under Title VII, the employee is still a proper defendant 
under the PHRA.  Generally, the PHRA is applied in accordance 
with Title VII.  Davis v. Sheraton Society Hill Hotel, 907 F. 
Supp. 896, 899 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1995).  Like Title VII, the 
definition of an employer under the PHRA cannot be construed to 
include "employees;" indeed, "employee" is defined as a wholly 
separate term under the Act.  See 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.  
 954(b) & (c).  The employment discrimination provision of the 
PHRA declares only that "any employer" may be held liable.  See43 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann.  955(a). 
     A different section of the PHRA, however, contemplates 
liability that extends beyond that of Title VII.  Section 955(e) 
forbids "any person, employer, employment agency, labor 
organization or employee, to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce 
the doing of any act declared by this section to be an unlawful 
discriminatory practice . . . ."  43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.  
 955(e).  Both Brison and Monaco certainly qualify as 
"person[s]" and "employee[s]" under  955(e).  The question, 
then, is whether either of them may be a proper defendant under 
the section for aiding and abetting the unlawful discriminatory 
practices of Dici's employer. 
     We find that summary judgment in favor of Brison on Dici's 
PHRA claim is appropriate because Brison is not a proper 
defendant under  955(e).  Dici's PHRA claim against the 
Appellees rests upon, as her complaint states, their failure "to 
take prompt remedial measures after having notification that 
discriminatory actions had occurred."  Dici has alleged no facts 
that would indicate that Brison aided or abetted Dici's employer 
in refusing to take prompt remedial action against any 
discrimination suffered by Dici.  Rather, her complaint alleges 
only direct incidents of Brison's harassment.  Such incidents are 
not covered by the terms of  955(e).  As one court has said in 
construing a nearly identical provision of the New Jersey Law 
Against Discrimination: 
 
     One might argue, of course, that both [the employee and 
     the employer] share the "intent" to create a 
     discriminatory atmosphere.  We believe, however, that 
     the employer's reaction is sufficiently divorced from 
     the employee's conduct that there is no community of 
     purpose between them.  A non-supervisory employee who 
     engages in discriminatory conduct cannot be said to 
     "intend" that his employer fail to respond. 
Tyson v. Cigna Corp., 918 F. Supp. 836, 841 (D.N.J. 1996).   
     We cannot, however, grant summary judgment to Monaco on 
Dici's PHRA claim.  As Dici's supervisor, Monaco is a proper 
defendant under  955(e) and might be liable for aiding and 
abetting discriminatory practices, as Dici has pleaded facts 
which, if true, could impose liability for violations of the 
PHRA.  For example, in paragraph 14 of the complaint, Dici 
states, "[a]lthough Sergeant Monaco knew or should have known 
that the Plaintiff was being subject to . . . harassment . . ., 
he repeatedly refused to take prompt action to end the harassment 
directed at Plaintiff . . . ."  Such conduct, if proven, would 
constitute aiding and abetting. 
     However, because Monaco cannot be held liable under Title 
VII, there exists no independent jurisdictional basis to maintain 
a PHRA claim against Monaco in federal court.  We, therefore, 
leave it to the district court to decide whether to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.  1367 (1994) over 
Dici's PHRA claim against Monaco. 
 
                            CONCLUSION 
     For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in 
part, and remand to the district court the grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the Appellees. 
